Hallo wereld!

Introduction

After years of experimenting with composing, the work before you was first published on the Internet in 2009, as a translation and adaptation of the third chapter of another, larger, work, written in Dutch, Waarneming & Waarheid (Perception & Truth). The author had studied philosophy for a few years at the University of Amsterdam in the early 1970s, had then found himself unable to pursue the curriculum for a number of reasons, and had since moved on in different directions, though not without retaining a special interest in perception philosophy. In the late 1980s an opportunity arose to spend more time on the subject, and a first draft in Dutch was completed in 1988, in two chapters and centred round two works of reference, the Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, by the empiricist George Berkeley [I], and the booklet Better Eyesight without Glasses, by the American ophthalmologist M.H. Bates M.D. [II]. The latter involves a method of visual re-education, and the results of practicing the method were thought to enhance any understanding of a number of core issues relevant to perception philosophy. A third chapter was produced in the 1990s, with a thorough appreciation of the collected works by the American author of Peruvian descent, Carlos Castaneda, added to the balance. In 2011 both works together were published on the internet again, in a new design and after extensive editing and rewriting. Meanwhile, Waarneming & Waarheid had been renamed Waarneming & Grammatica (Perception & Grammar), and a fourth chapter may perhaps be completed in the near future.

The Third World, then, deserves to be considered a work in its own right. Taken together, the above-mentioned works are a reflection of engineered thought-provoking content, not necessarily philosophical, and initially stimulated by a surprising discovery of grammar-like infrastructural patterns of perception. These may give rise to the concluding assumption of the possible existence of a ‘language of perception’. With grammar being a system of rules derived from practice, and therefore also applicable to current forms of language education, there seems to be no urgent need for a proper theory of grammar. Rules of grammar are after all taught with the help of examples taken from randomly selected texts. Inasmuch as rules facilitate an understanding of texts, such understanding will then be based and dependent on the use of analogies. A proper theory of grammar, however, cannot be relied upon to provide a basis for the use of analogies. A language theory perhaps could, but only in combination with a system of grammar that can do without such use of analogies, and likely derives from an immediate understanding of rules and how these are best to be adhered to and applied. The basis for a theory of language can, after all, to all intents and purposes not be found in a theory of grammar. It is here then that the likelihood of a possible alternative to comparative grammar presents itself, a perhaps latent ‘theory of perception’, underlying a ‘language of perception’. The overall design of these works includes a search for and possible unveiling of such theory of perception.

Comparative grammar may draw attention to verifiable similarities and differences between grammars, yet still fails to explain how these relate to equally verifiable appreciations of reality, because as comparative as a grammar would appear to be, it would still presuppose one reality for all, a shared reality, that is to say, a shared notion of reality, which does not, unlike a shared reality, presents itself to the senses of its own accord. It is not difficult to see that a notion of reality can be more readily shared than a perception of reality, because it is actually an abstraction from reality. It may pertain to a certain perceiving of reality, but is itself not a perception. A presupposed shared perception of reality would then be in need of a theory as much as a presupposed shared notion of reality, or else be lost to the mind that requires explanations, based on models of suppositions, argumentations, and conclusions.

.To that end we may point out that philosophy, perception philosophy and in particular empiricism, may find building blocks for theories by employing methods of deconstruction of complex realities. Prior to considering an element of nature still to be named, a habit of naming is employed that selects apparent essential characteristics for use in the event of a find of such element. For example, its name will be in Latin, and usually also refers to the person who was the first to discover or publish it. Other habits of naming would involve the properties or attributes of objects, their forms of appearance, heritage, their purpose or their significance in general, such as with names of real or imaginary persons and objects, although such practices would only lead to arbitrary results and would preclude any systematic application or deconstruction. The empiricist/idealist John Locke [III] scoffed at those responsible for such naming practices as being ‘ignorant and illiterate’ people, and George Berkeley, a critic of Locke, argued that when setting aside not just their secondary, sensible, qualities, but also their primary ones, the only claim to existence of corporeal substances would be in their names [IV]. Plato, in his Kratylos, makes fun of the ancient name-givers, or in his words: ‘legislators’ and ‘orators’, but also criticises any suggestion of allowing people to come up with names of their own making. If names are chosen and applied that are natural and just, properly reflective of their substances, he feels we would be hard put to find better alternatives. Still, the distinction draws attention to the significance of the name-giving process, and especially, given that both names and substances (denotata, referents, nominata [V]) may change over time, to the likelihood of a default relationship of meaning between them that would never be lost, and could perhaps still be sensed immediately, rather than understood eventually.

.Such default relationship of meaning may perhaps be found in the evolution of language. These days we tend to separate the name from what or who it is that the name refers to, and thinkers and speakers would find themselves challenged when having to explain the nature of such bilateral relationship first of all. In fact, many before us in the distant past did not differentiate between person, name, and artistic representation; although it must be admitted that these persons, both real and imaginary, usually enjoyed an elevated status in society. For example, in those ‘pre-Socratic’ times an ontic distinction between a living deity and its named representation no longer prevailed, for as much as the name would perish with its bearer, the worship of its representation would also come to an end. Worshippers had a relationship with the name, image or sculpture as with a living being, and a name was never just a grammatical term. Therefore, for practical purposes we will for the time being ignore whatever significance names may have, and since names are perceived as words in a world constructed with language, what significance is lost may then perhaps still be recovered in a world other than singularly language-based. Still, access to such world will not be easily granted if we proceed, as we do, from a language-based world. Even if we succeed in liberating ourselves from the grid of grammar that gives structure to language, we would still feel the need to communicate about this event; which by default would suspend or end our sojourn in the unknown. Once we have learned to speak, we seem to be unable to unlearn it. Perhaps we can learn to unlearn it, and forget that others have taught us to speak for a purpose, that is, to communicate.

Prior to the need to formulate, there is a need to think. What causes this need for thinking? Thinking appears to be causally related to events outside, or taking place somewhere else, like a baby seeing the face of its mother, and hearing her speak, or a toddler looking in the mirror for the first time, or a first day at school. A world still unknown in its extension, but nevertheless close by, approachable, touchable. We take our first steps in response to a world, by making sense of what our senses permit us to receive. We discover that all these events, objects, people are there for a reason, and that is how we begin to think, before anything else. We therefore, and it is to be emphasised, do not think of ourselves before anything else.

It behoves us, therefore, to assume already from the outset that not only is perception passive and dependent on a ‘world outside’, but thinking cannot take place until we have been made to exchange a sense of reality for a shared notion of reality. In view of its passivity perception is not subject to the demands of a reality or world outside for explanations or justifications, and its dependency on a reality for supplying material to the senses therefore leaves room for some form of empirical self-reflection. Immanuel Kant’s ‘Transzendental Philosophie’ [VI] rests on this absence of an a priori provision by nature for thinking of ourselves. His philosophy was meant to fill this void left by (early) empiricism, although grammar already provides a gateway beyond in the sentence nucleus, more specifically in the space between the subject and the predicate (logos). It is therefore imperative for a student of perception philosophy to find common ground between sensory perception and, first of all, grammar formation. If we now, as experienced as we are, unlike before when we first became instructed in the use of language, are able to allow a first structure or setting of language to take place, and in a controlled way, and reverse the order of formative stages to include both perception and language, we might then perhaps be fortunate enough to be able to move eventually from a notion of reality to a reality, a Third World, at will.

It is my hope that this work will become a valuable contribution to that end.

Paul (P.M.) Grätz, location Amsterdam, the capital of The Netherlands, April 2026.

NOTES

I George Berkeley, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, London 1732.

II W.H. Bates, M.D., The Bates Method for Better Eyesight without Glasses, Panther Books 1983.

III John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, fourth edition, Book III, Chapter VI, § 25, Oxford World’s Classics paperback 2008.

IV George Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge/Three Dialogues, 1713, Penguin Books 1988, sections 73-75.

V For ‘referents’, see: Chris Baldick, The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 186. For ‘nominata’, see: Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, The University of Chicago Press, Midway Reprint 1988, Ch. III, p. 96.

VI Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1998.

Hallo wereld!

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